Pillar Guide
Operational technology: computers whose output is physics
What operational technology is, why OT and IT grew apart, and how data, remote access, and AI are forcing them back together. From four years on plant networks.
Topic
Industrial Control Systems
Industrial control systems (ICS) are the computers, controllers, and networks that operate physical processes — from refineries to utilities. This section covers ICS and SCADA architecture, OT/IT convergence, and the security engineering that keeps physical processes safe.
- ICS and SCADA architecture
- OT network security and segmentation
- OT/IT convergence
- Process-control operations
- Industrial threat landscape
Start here
The pillar guides — orientation pages that map this territory and point to the deep-dive articles.
Pillar Guide
SCADA security: a practitioner's map of the discipline
SCADA security explained by an engineer who ran plant control networks: why OT differs from IT, the real threat model, and the control set that works.
Articles & guides
Critical infrastructure protection: a dependency problem
Critical infrastructure protection explained by dependency: sector interdependencies, CISA and NERC CIP context, and the defenses that matter to operators.
OT remote access architecture: vendor access without regret
Safe remote access to industrial control systems: jump architecture, session brokering, MFA, break-glass paths, and what should never be exposed.
OT/IT convergence: a strategy operations will accept
OT/IT convergence beyond the buzzword: shared services that work, the patching reality, who owns the boundary firewall, and earning trust with operations.
The ICS threat landscape: what actually hits operators
A realistic ICS threat landscape for operators: ransomware spillover, exposed devices, vendor access — and what Stuxnet through PIPEDREAM really teach.
SCADA Network Design: Polling, Protocols, and Redundancy
SCADA network design from the wire up: polling vs report-by-exception, Modbus and DNP3 security realities, redundancy, time sync, and remote site links.
The Purdue model in 2026: what still holds, what broke
An honest engineer's take on the Purdue model: the levels and OT DMZ explained, what cloud and IIoT actually broke, and how to apply it to real plants now.
ICS security fundamentals: systems that move physics
What makes ICS security different from IT: availability-first priorities, decade-long asset lifecycles, physical consequences, and the control set that works.